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Epistemic permissivism says that sometimes there are multiple rational 
responses to the same body of evidence. A recent argument against 
permissivism says that this view is incompatible with a plausible understanding 
of the accuracy-conduciveness of rationality, according to which rationality is 
accuracy-conducive because rational credence is more expectedly accurate than 
irrational credence. This is called ‘the value problem for permissivism.’ In this 
paper, I propose a new response to this problem. I defend a convergence-
theoretic epistemology: Rationality is accuracy-conducive not because rational 
credence is more expectedly accurate than irrational credence, but because 
rational credence performs better with regard to convergence to truth. Drawing 
on recent developments in formal learning theory, I argue that this 
‘convergence-to-truth’ understanding of the accuracy-conduciveness of 
rationality has many attractive features, and I argue that the convergence 
understanding is compatible with and even favors permissivism.  
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1. Introduction  
Can there sometimes be multiple rational responses to the same body of evidence? An 
impermissivist says no, while a permissivist says yes. The former thinks that rationality is 
strict—it doesn’t allow any leeway in how we should respond to our evidence. The latter 
thinks that rationality is slack—people with the same evidence can rationally respond 
differently, due to differences in factors such as epistemic standards, background beliefs, 
practical stakes, ways of weighing theoretical virtues, etc.1 If we assume a Bayesian setting in 
which rational responses to evidence take the form of conditionalization, then the 
impermissivist thinks that there is a unique rational prior probability, whereas the 
permissivist thinks that there are many rational priors.  
Most Bayesians are permissivists. In particular, subjective Bayesianism (which says 
that there are many rational priors) represents the position that’s called ‘interpersonal 
permissivism,’ since it implies that rational credence given a set of evidence is unique for a 
person but could vary across persons (Kelly 2014; Schoenfield 2014). However, recently, 
                                               
1 Recent defenders of impermissivism include Dogramaci and Horowitz (2016), Greco and Hedden (2016), 
Horowitz (2014, 2019), Schultheis (2018), and White (2014). Recent defenders of permissivism include Kelly 
(2014), Meacham (2019), Palmira (forthcoming), Schoenfield (2014, 2019), Thorstad (2019), and Ye (2019). 
Weisberg (2020) defends a mixed position: Evidential support is unique but rationality is permissive.   
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subjective Bayesianism has faced an important objection that is forcefully presented by 
Horowitz (2014, 2019). Roughly, the objection is that we think rationality is valuable because 
it’s accuracy-conducive, and yet we can only make sense of the accuracy-conduciveness of 
rationality if we assume rationality is impermissive. This is the so-called ‘the value problem 
for permissivim.’2  
This paper proposes a new response to the value problem. Here is the plan. First, I 
explain the value problem in greater detail (Section 2). Then I propose a new response by 
defending a novel approach to rationality that I call ‘convergence-theoretic epistemology’ 
(Section 3). Drawing on recent developments in formal learning theory, I argue that this 
convergence approach has several attractive features and that it is compatible with and even 
favors permissivism (Section 4). Then I answer a series of worries about the convergence-
theoretic epistemology (Section 5). Section 6 concludes the paper. I hope that this paper 
provides a novel understanding of the value of permissive rationality. I also hope that it will 
initiate further explorations of the convergence-theoretic epistemology, about what it can do 
and what it can imply for other debates in epistemology.   
 
2. The Value Problem for Permissivism 
Epistemologists often claim that rationality is truth-conducive, or, in the case of 
credence, they claim that rationality is accuracy-conducive. It’s not clear what exactly that 
means. One natural understanding is that rational credence functions are more accurate than 
irrational credence functions on average. And since what happens on average could be 
expressed as what happens in expectation relative to some probability function, the above 
understanding of the accuracy-conduciveness of rationality is often put as the claim that 
rational credence has greater expected accuracy relative to some relevant probability function 
p (Horowitz, 2014, 2019; Schoenfield, 2015; Wedgwood, 2017, Ch. 9).  
 What’s the probability function p here? Most scholars in the debate on the value of 
permissive rationality (which include both the impermissivist Horowitz and the permissivist 
Schoenfield) happen to adopt some internalist stance: they have interpreted p as a rational 
credence function. On this interpretation, to say that rationality is accuracy-conducive is to 
say that, relative to a body of evidence, a rational credence has greater expected accuracy 
than an irrational credence from any rational point of view. (Note that here we are silent on 
whether the rational point of view is unique.) We can put this idea more precisely as follows.  
 
Expectation Constraint 
                                               
2 Note that the value problem discussed in this paper is about the value of being rational in the pursuit of truth. 
This is different from the value problem discussed by Dogramaci and Horowitz (2016), which is about the value 
of attributing rationality—they argue that permissivists cannot explain the value of our practice of attributing 
rationality or irrationality to one another in society, because such practice would not be efficient in promoting 
social coordination if permissivism were true. Similarly, the challenge for permissivism raised by Levinstein 
(2017) and Greco and Hedden (2016) also concerns rationality-attribution: They argue that permissivists can’t 
explain the value of rationality attribution in planning and deference. For permissivists’ responses to the value 
problem of rationality-attribution, see Thorstad (2019) and Meacham (2019).  
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Let E be an arbitrary body of evidence. For any credence function c that is rational 
given E, if c assigns 1 to ‘credence cr is rational given E and cr* is irrational,’ then 
relative to c, the expected accuracy of cr is greater than that of cr*.  
 
A principle like the Expectation Constraint has been implicitly accepted by many 
scholars (Horowitz, 2014, 2019; Wedgwood, 2017, Ch. 9; Schoenfield, 2015, pp. 636–8). 
Horowitz (2014; 2019) argues that permissivism faces a value problem because it’s 
incompatible with this constraint: If you are in an acknowledged permissive case, you will 
regard some irrational credence as more expectedly accurate than some rational credence. 
Here is a reconstruction of her example. 
Suppose that you are in an acknowledged permissive case about a proposition H; in 
particular, suppose that you are certain that the range of rational credence in H is [0.6, 0.9]. 
Then, unless you happen to adopt the midpoint credence of this range, you will regard some 
credence outside the range more expectedly accurate than some credence inside the range. 
For instance, suppose your credence in H is 0.9. Then you would regard 0.95 more 
expectedly accurate than 0.6. This is because our accuracy measure has this feature: your 
expectation of how accurate a credence is depends on how close that credence is to your own 
credence—you would expect closer credence to be more accurate.3 (In particular, our 
accuracy measure is generated by ‘strictly proper’ scoring rules so that a probabilistically 
coherent person would expect her own credence to be uniquely maximally accurate.) Due to 
this feature, if you don’t happen to occupy the midpoint of the rational range, there will be 
credence outside the range that’s closer to you than some credence within the range, and thus 
there will be irrational credence that you expect to be more accurate than some rational 
credence.  
So, permissivism is incompatible with the Expectation Constraint. In contrast, 
impermissivism is compatible with the constraint.4 If impermissivism were true, any rational 
agent would regard a rational credence as more expectedly accurate than an irrational 
credence, because any rational agent can make the argument ‘my own credence is rational; if 
cr is also rational then it matches my own credence given impermissivism; my own credence 
uniquely maximizes expected accuracy given strict propriety; thus, if cr is rational, it must 
uniquely maximize expected accuracy’ (Horowitz, 2014, pp. 46–7; 2019, pp. 256–61). 
Permissivists have offered several responses to the value problem. Some target the 
above argument that impermissivism is compatible the Expectation Constraint. They claim 
that the argument falsely assumes that rational agents are always certain of their own 
rationality, or that it suffers vicious circularity, or that it falsely assumes that rational agents 
always have precise credence (Schoenfield, 2019, p. 290; Thorstad, 2019, p. 911). Others 
deny the Expectation Constraint. For instance, Schoenfield (2019, fn. 16) suggests a 
‘bracketing strategy,’ which says that rational agents sometimes need to bracket their own 
credence in evaluating the expected accuracy of others’ credence. So, it’s not true that 
                                               
3 This point clearly holds relative to the accuracy measure Brier score and the squared Euclidean distance that 
generates it. For a more general argument for this point, see Pettigrew (2013, pp. 32–3). (His proof would still 
go through if we replace the chance function in it with an arbitrary probability function.)   
4 Some impermissivists (such as Horowitz (2019)) even claim that their view explains the constraint.  
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rational credence should maximize expected accuracy from all rational perspectives. 
Schoenfield (2019) also defends an ‘endorsement proposal’ as an alternative account of the 
accuracy-conduciveness of rationality and argues that this proposal favors permissivism.  
Existing impermissivists have not been convinced by the above responses. For 
instance, Horowitz (2019) has raised several doubts about the bracketing strategy and the 
endorsement proposal. In this paper, I won’t delve into the issue of whether permissivists can 
overcome those doubts.5 Rather, I will use the value problem as an opportunity to motivate a 
convergence-theoretic approach to rationality. I will argue that this new approach provides a 
promising understanding of the accuracy-conduciveness of rationality and that it’s 
compatible with and even favors permissivism.     
 
3. A New Response: Convergence-to-Truth as Accuracy-Conduciveness         
3.1 An Initial Motivation For a Convergence-Theoretic Epistemology  
Suppose that two of your friends, Hanna and Leo, share evidence with you. Currently, 
Hanna’s credence function is cr1, Leo’s is cr2, and from your current point of view, cr1 is less 
expectedly accurate than cr2. Can there still be a plausible sense of accuracy-conduciveness 
in which you regard Hanna’s credence as more accuracy-conducive than Leo’s?  
Here is a reason for a positive answer. Even if you don’t regard Hanna’s credence cr1 
as more expectedly accurate than Leo’s credence cr2 in your current evidential situation, you 
might know that, by relying on her credence cr1 as priors, Hanna will update to more and 
more accurate credence as more evidence is gained, but Leo won’t update to more and more 
accurate credence by relying on his credence cr2 as priors. That is, you might know that 
Hanna will converge to truth if she updates on an increasing body of evidence whereas Leo 
won’t converge to truth given the same increasing body of evidence. If so, then even if you 
regard cr1 as less expectedly accurate than cr2 in the current evidential situation, you can still 
regard cr1 as a better ‘learning tool’ than cr2 in pursuing accuracy; so, in some sense of 
accuracy-conduciveness, you can regard cr1 as more accuracy-conducive.  
I will explain this convergence understanding of accuracy-conduciveness more 
precisely below, but here is a crude example to explain how it differs from the Expectation 
Constraint. Suppose that your current credence in a proposition p is 0.3, Hanna’s credence in 
p is 0.9, and Leo’s credence in p is 0. Then you regard Hanna’s credence in p as less 
expectedly accurate than Leo’s credence. However, assuming that Hanna meets certain 
conditions (which are explained below), you can be certain that, if p were true, her credence 
in p will approach certainty as she gains more evidence, and if p were false, her credence in p 
will approach 0 as she gains more evidence. By contrast, you are certain that Leo won’t 
perform so well as more evidence is gained—since his current credence in p is 0, it will 
remain 0 no matter how much more evidence he gains. So, you are certain that Hanna will 
converge to the truth about p in both the p-worlds and the not-p worlds, but Leo won’t 
converge to the truth in the p-worlds. In this case, it seems that there is an important sense in 
which you can regard Hanna’s credence as more accuracy-conducive than Leo’s credence, 
even if you regard it as less expectedly accurate in your current evidential situation.  
                                               
5 See Palmira (forthcoming) for an attempt to overcome Horowitz’s (2019) doubts about the endorsement 
proposal. 
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This example suggests an understanding of the accuracy-conduciveness of rationality 
different from the Expectation Constraint. According to this new understanding, the value of 
rationality in pursuing accuracy doesn’t lie in how expectedly accurate a rational credence is 
in a static evidential situation, but in how rational persons perform in a dynamic situation 
where they get more and more evidence. Rational persons, even if they are highly inaccurate 
in a static evidential situation, will become more and more accurate by updating on an 
increasing body of evidence, whereas there is no such guarantee for irrational persons. I call 
this understanding of the accuracy-conduciveness of rationality ‘Convergence Constraint,’ 
which says, 
 
Convergence Constraint (roughly formulated) 
A rational credence function performs better than an irrational credence function with 
respect to convergence to truth. 
 
In what follows, I will do three things. First, I clarify the notion of ‘convergence to truth’ and 
I explain what counts as ‘performing better’ with respect to convergence to truth. Second, I 
argue that the Convergence Constraint is an attractive view about the accuracy-conduciveness 
of rationality. Third, I argue that the Convergence Constraint is compatible with and even 
favors permissivism.  
 
3.2 Clarifying the Convergence Constraint  
Before I get started, I should note that, although my primary aim in this paper is to defend 
permissivism, I also aim to urge scholars in the accuracy-centered epistemology to pay more 
attention to the convergence understanding of accuracy-conduciveness. Currently, much of 
the work in the accuracy-centered epistemology focuses on justifying rationality norms by 
showing that they are accuracy-conducive in some sense, using mostly decision-theoretic 
norms like non-dominance, maximizing expected accuracy, or maxi-min (Joyce, 1998; 
Greaves & Wallace, 2006; Pettigrew, 2016). Norms involving convergence-to-truth haven’t 
yet received much attention. But convergence to truth is an interesting and fruitful 
understanding of the elusive notion of truth-conduciveness—this is the reason why the 
convergence approach has become a major approach in formal learning theories, theories 
designed to study what kind of learning methods are most reliable and efficient in satisfying 
our cognitive goals. So, it’s worth exploring the ramifications of accepting convergence to 
truth as an understanding of the truth-conduciveness of rationality.6 
Now, what is ‘converging to truth’ exactly? I will clarify this notion using a typical 
model in Bayesian versions of formal learning theory. The first basic concept is a ‘learning 
problem.’ A learning problem can be identified with a pair (W, F), where W is a set of 
possibilities compatible with one’s current evidence and F is a set of hypotheses to be 
                                               
6 An early application of formal learning theory to traditional epistemological problems is Putnam’s (1963) 
criticism of Carnap’s measure of confirmation, where Putnam argues that Carnap’s measure is inadequate 
because it doesn’t satisfy the condition that the ‘instance confirmation’ of a true hypothesis converges to 1 (or 
even stays above 0.5) as more and more observations are made. For contemporary philosophy-oriented 
introductions of formal learning theory, see Juhl (1997), Kelly et al. (1997), and Schulte (1999a, 1999b). For 
introductions that include more formal details, see Kelly (1996).  
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learned. Each possible world in W specifies a possible infinite stream of evidence, a way of 
how the world might unfold for one from now on as time grows indefinitely. And a 
hypothesis in F is a subset of W. The second basic concept is a ‘learning method.’ One’s 
learning method is identified with a function from initial segments of evidence streams in W 
to credence functions. This is meant to capture the fact that, at any finite stage of our inquiry, 
we can’t observe an infinite evidence stream in its entirety but only its initial, finite segment. 
A Bayesian agent’s learning method is encoded in her current credence function. In each 
world w, her credence function updates sequentially by conditionalizing on the initial 
segments of the evidence stream in w.  
To illustrate, consider this toy model. Suppose that a Bayesian agent, whose current 
credence is represented by a probability function P, wants to know whether a coin is fair and 
he tries to figure it out by flipping the coin repeatedly, and suppose that his flipping could 
carry out indefinitely long. We can model this learning problem as (W, F), where each point 
w ∈ W is a countably infinite binary sequence representing a possible outcome of the infinite 
coin toss such as (HHTH…), F is a set of subsets of W that represents propositions the agent 
is interested in learning. Note that the learning problem must be compatible with the agent’s 
current evidence, in the sense that W only includes worlds that are consistent with her current 
evidence. At each later time n, the agent tosses the coin, notes the result, and thus expands his 
evidence. Let Enw ⊆ W be the set of all binary sequences whose n-initial segment is the same 
as w’s, so that it represents the agent’s evidence in w after n tosses. Finally, for each 
proposition A in F, let IA(w) be the indicator function of A in w, that is, IA(w) = 1 if A is true 
in w and IA(w) = 0 otherwise. To say that the Bayesian agent converges to the truth in world 
w as he gets more evidence is to say that, for any A in F, 
             	 lim
'→)
P(A	|E'/) = 	 I3(w) 
That is, an agent converges to truth in w if, as the agent gets more evidence in w, his 
posteriors function approaches the omniscient credence function in w.  
With the notion ‘convergence to truth in a world’ explained, we can explain what it is 
for a credence to ‘perform better’ with regard to convergence to truth than another credence. 
We do this by distinguishing various modes of convergence:  
 
a. Speed of convergence: convergence can happen fast or slow.  
b. Domain of convergence: convergence can happen on a larger or smaller set of 
worlds in the state space.  
c. Stability of convergence: convergence can be stable or unstable.7 
d. Frequency of retraction in convergence: you might need to change your mind 
more (or less) frequently in converging to truth.8 
 
                                               
7 A credence function converges to truth stably in a world w if, at the first time it updates to a high confidence in 
the truth in w, it continues to update to high confidence in the truth in w. That is, once it outputs the truth it will 
never let the truth go.  
8 A credence function ‘changes its mind’ on a proposition A at some stage n if it’s highly confident in A at time 
n–1 and yet highly confident in not-A at n. 
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Among these modes of convergence, some are clearly desirable while others are not so 
clearly desirable. For instance, speed-optimal convergence, convergence in a maximal 
domain, and convergence that minimizes possible times of retraction all seem desirable. But 
it’s not clear whether stability in convergence is desirable. This issue will not be settled here, 
since my later arguments don’t hang on it. The important point is that, using the above 
distinction among various modes of convergence, we can clarify ‘performing better in 
convergence’ and clarify the Convergence Constraint as follows:  
 
Convergence Constraint (better formulated) 
A rational credence function given a set of evidence performs better than an irrational 
credence function with regard to convergence to truth in the following sense: in 
solving those learning problems that are compatible with the evidence, a rational 
credence achieves all the desirable modes of convergence that can be achieved 
whereas an irrational credence doesn’t; or, when it’s impossible to achieve all the 
desirable modes of convergence in a learning problem, a rational credence strikes 
better balance with regard to those modes than an irrational credence does.  
 
Let’s call a theory of rationality that makes the above constraint its essential 
commitment ‘a convergence-theoretic epistemology.’ In the following section, I argue that 
this novel epistemology has several attractive features. Before that, I will address two 
immediate worries. 
First, you might worry that the constraint would make rationality relative to learning 
problems, since the convergence properties of a learning method are characterized relative to 
a learning problem modelled as (W, F), and it’s possible that no learning method does better 
than others for all learning problems.   
However, this consequence of relativity is acceptable. Note that, on the above model 
of learning problems, the goodness of a method is relative to what evidential streams are 
possible (i.e., what W includes) and relative to what hypotheses you are interested in learning 
(i.e., what F includes). The first aspect of the relativity is perfectly acceptable—since 
elements of W are fixed by one’s evidence, this just means that what credence functions are 
rational is relative to one’s evidence. The relativity to what we are interested in learning is 
also acceptable. If adopting a credence function at least partly means adopting a learning 
method, then just like whether any old method is good is relative to what problems it’s used 
to solve, whether a learning method is good is relative to what learning problems it’s used to 
solve. Consider an extreme example. If, for some reason, you are just not interested in 
learning any empirical hypothesis, then presumably it doesn’t matter whether you are an 
inductivist or a counterinductivist.  
Moreover, even if you don’t like the above kind of relativity, we can revise the 
Convergence Constraint to avoid it, by adding a criterion of ‘no weak-dominance’: Given a 
body of evidence, a rational method M is not weakly dominated by other methods with 
respect to the hypotheses to be learned; that is, no other method does no worse than M for all 
the hypotheses to be learned and does better than M for some hypotheses.  
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There is a second immediate worry: Perhaps the Convergence Constraint is not a 
substantive constraint on rationality at all, because of the Bayesian ‘washing out’ theorems. 
Basically, these theorems say that differences in Bayesian agents’ priors don’t matter because 
eventually they all converge to truth under certain reasonably weak conditions.9 
 This worry is misguided. Bayesian washing out theorems all concern ‘almost sure’ 
convergence; that is, they all have the form that, under certain conditions, any Bayesian agent 
assigns 1 to the proposition that she will converge to truth. So they only say that Bayesian 
agents will think that they will converge to truth, not that they will converge to truth in fact, 
and the kind of convergence that formal learning theorists care about is convergence to truth 
in fact.10 And convergence from one’s own point of view can’t give rise to the kind of 
objectivity or truth-conduciveness we want: if one’s credence function merely allows one to 
assign 1 to the proposition that one will converge to truth while in fact it doesn’t converge to 
truth in a large region in the state space, one’s credence function doesn’t seem to be 
genuinely truth-conducive (Earman, 1992, pp. 147–8; Kelly et al., 1997, pp. 261–3).11  
 
3.3 Interesting/Attractive Features of the Convergence-Theoretic Epistemology  
The idea that we could evaluate learning methods (also known as ‘inductive 
inferential rules’) by studying their convergence properties has a lot of supporters outside of 
mainstream epistemology. Besides formal learning theorists, those doing large sample theory 
in statistics also study convergence properties: In estimator-evaluation, they focus on 
convergence properties such as statistical consistency, unbiasedness, efficiency, etc. In what 
follows, I list some interesting features of convergence-theoretic epistemology. I admit that 
the attractiveness of some of those features might be more controversial than that of the 
others, but I hope to convince you that the features viewed as a package make convergence-
theoretic epistemology an interesting theory that deserves further exploration.  
3.3.1 Explaining the value of rationality dynamically. Convergence-theoretic 
epistemology shares a core commitment of the current decision-theoretic accuracy-centered 
epistemology, which says that one’s credence is rational only if it’s a good tool for achieving 
one’s accuracy goals. But when it comes to what makes a credence function a good tool for 
achieving accuracy goals, convergence-theoretic epistemology has a different focus than the 
current decision-theoretic accuracy-centered epistemology: rather than focusing on the 
                                               
9 For instance, Savage (1972, pp. 46–50) proves that, in those experiments where observations have independent 
and identical distributions, any Bayesian agent converges to truth almost surely. Hawthorne (2018) strengthens 
Savage’s proof by relaxing the ‘identical distribution’ condition. Gaifman and Snir (1982) prove that, if the 
evidence one is about to accumulate ‘separates’ the state space, then one almost surely converges to truth.  
10 The most important mode of convergence for formal learning theorists concerns domain of convergence: A 
learning method does well with regard to this mode if it achieves ‘sure convergence’ (or what is called ‘logical 
reliability’), which takes the form:  
 For every w in W, lim
'→)
P(A	|E'/) = 	 I3(w) 
This differs sharply from ‘almost sure convergence,’ which takes the form:  
 P({w ∈ W: lim
'→)
P(A	|E'/) = 	 I3(w)}) = 1. 
11 It’s worth noting that emphasizing actual convergence is compatible with internalism about rationality: As we 
will see in the next subsection, it’s knowable a priori whether a learning method has better convergence 
performance than another learning method. 
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benefit of rationality in a static evidential situation, it focuses on the benefit of rationality in a 
dynamic situation where evidence grows. This focus on dynamicity is inspired by an ordinary 
observation: when a person employs a rational method and yet fails to find the truth, we 
sometimes attribute her failure to her lacking sufficient evidence; that is, we think that if she 
gains more evidence she probably would find the truth. This suggests that one way of testing 
whether a learning method is good is to look at how well the method performs in a dynamic 
process where one’s evidential situation evolves with time. Rational persons might not do 
well at initial stages of inquiry, but as evidence grows they will do better than irrational 
persons.   
Of course, the convergence-theoretic epistemology focuses on an idealized version of 
the above dynamic picture: It assumes that the evidence could grow without bounds. Some 
readers might balk at this idealization. But as I will argue in Section 5, considering its 
usefulness, the idealization is no more obnoxious than the other kinds of idealizations that we 
are used to in doing Bayesian epistemology.  
 3.3.2 Continuity with the Platonic value on stability. Recall the basic idea behind 
the notion ‘convergence-to-truth in a world.’ The limit notation says that, for any positive 
distance from the truth, no matter how small, there is a finite time at which the method 
outputs credence within that distance, and it continues to do so at all later times. Putting the 
convergence idea in terms of binary beliefs, a method converges to truths in a world if it 
outputs true beliefs at some finite time and continues to do so at all later times; that is, not 
only it finds the truths at some finite time, it also settles on, or ‘tethers’ the truth from that 
time on. This idea of settling on the truth is not entirely new. It resonates with an old, 
Platonic stability theory of knowledge. In Meno, Plato argues that knowledge is more 
valuable than a mere true belief:   
For these [true opinions], so long as they stay with us, are a fine possession, and effect 
all that is good; but they do not care to stay for long, and run away out of the human 
soul, and thus are of no great value until one makes them fast with causal 
reasoning … But once they are fastened, in the first place they turn into knowledge, 
and in the second, are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more prized than right 
opinion, the one transcends the other by its trammels. (Plato, 1924, p. 363)   
 
The idea here is that the stability of a true belief makes it more valuable than a mere true 
belief. And although Plato is talking about knowledge in the quotation, there is no reason 
why we couldn’t extend the stability idea to rationality. Of course, there are many 
understandings of the stability. In epistemology, both the indefeasibility theory and the 
tracking theory of knowledge could be understood as ways of cashing out the stability idea—
both emphasize that, to have knowledge, one must not only have a true belief in one’s actual 
circumstance but also retain the true belief across a range of relevant circumstances. In 
researches about dynamic systems, the stability of a dynamic system sometimes refers to the 
system’s ability to converge to equilibrium in the long run, which is the essential idea behind 
the traditional concept ‘asymptotic stability’ in stability analysis. Applying this idea of 
‘convergence to equilibrium’ to learning methods, we get convergence-theoretic 
epistemology. The basic idea is that we can understand a person’s belief-revision process as 
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an evolving, dynamic system guided by the person’s learning method, and we can understand 
true beliefs as the equilibrium that the system strives for. Then the learning method is said to 
be good if, under its guidance, the dynamic system stabilizes on true beliefs after some finite 
time. So, convergence-theoretic epistemology could be viewed as a modern refinement of the 
old Platonic value of stability. (Note that the stability discussed here, which is achieved in 
every mode of convergence, should be distinguished from the ‘stability mode of 
convergence’ mentioned in Section 3.2.)  
 3.3.3 Fruitfulness in recovering norms of rationality. An important reason why 
current decision-theoretic, accuracy-centered epistemology is attractive lies in its success in 
recovering norms of rationality. As it happens, convergence-theoretic epistemology is also 
promising in recovering norms of rationality, although it still remains to be seen whether it 
can achieve the same scope of success as the current decision-theoretic epistemology does. 
For example, Schulte (1999b) argues that, in tackling Occam’s problems (i.e., problems that 
have the structure of learning propositions that hypothesize the existence of something, such 
as certain particles or nonblack ravens), a learning method must satisfy Occam’s Razor in 
order to achieve fast convergence on a maximal domain. He also argues that in learning 
problems discussed in the Goodman’s Riddle of Induction, a learning method must do natural 
projection rather than grue projection in order to minimax retraction (i.e., minimizing the 
greatest possible times of retraction) in converging to truth. Similar arguments for simplicity 
are developed by Kelly in a series of papers (2007, 2010). More recently, Lin (forthcoming) 
argues that, in tackling learning problems that have a similar structure with the hard raven 
problem (‘hard’ because the candidate hypotheses include a Cartesian scenario in which there 
are nonblack ravens but they will never be observed), a learning method must implement 
enumerative induction rather than counterinduction or the skeptic’s policy, in order to 
achieve stable convergence on a maximal domain. And Nielsen and Wofsey (2020) argue 
that, in learning problems concerning discovering the limiting relative frequency of an event, 
a credence function must satisfy a version of the reflection principle in order to achieve 
speed-optimal convergence.  
To get an idea of how such vindication might go, let’s see an example that’s familiar 
from learning theorists’ attempt to vindicate enumerative induction. Suppose that two 
persons, one enumerative inductivist and the other a counterinductivist, are interested in 
finding out whether all ravens are black, and they do so by sequentially observing an infinite 
sequence of ravens. Suppose that, before the observation, their priors have these properties: If 
they observe a nonblack raven, both will be certain that not all ravens are black; however, if 
all the n observed ravens at time n are black, the inductivist’s credence in ‘all ravens are 
black’ will approach certainty as n approaches infinity (let’s say that his credence at n will be 
1–1/(n+2)), whereas the counterinductivist’s credence in this proposition will never be 
greater than 1/3 (let’s say that his credence at n will be 1/3–1/(n+4).) So, no matter how many 
ravens are uniformly observed to be black, the counterinductivist will always be more 
confident that not all ravens are black than that all ravens are black. Then the 
counterinductivist will perform worse with regard to convergence to truth than the 
inductivist: both converge to truth in worlds with nonblack ravens, but only the inductivist 
converges to truth in worlds with all black ravens—in such worlds they will observe 
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uniformly black ravens, and given such observation, the inductivist’s credence in the truth 
will approach certainty, whereas the counterinductivist’s credence in the truth won’t be 
greater than 1/3. (Note that this fact about the two persons’ convergence performance can be 
known a priori; that is, the counterinductivist can know before the observation that his own 
credence is worse than the inductivist in convergence to truth.) Since the counterinductivist’s 
learning method doesn’t achieve all the desirable modes of convergence that can be achieved, 
the Convergence Constraint implies that it’s irrational. 
3.3.4 Perspective-neutrality in explaining the value of rationality. A striking 
feature of convergence-theoretic epistemology lies in its perspective-neutrality in explaining 
the value of rationality. Recall that the Expectation Constraint discussed in Section 2 
essentially says that a rational credence has greater expected accuracy than an irrational 
credence from the perspective of any rational person. So, it can’t explain the value of 
rationality from the perspective of those irrational persons who also care about accuracy; 
thus, it can’t explain why even irrational persons should also want to be rational. And this 
problem of perspective-relativity is common to any expected-accuracy explanation of the 
value of rationality, since expected-accuracy is always relative to some probability function.  
The convergence-theoretic epistemology doesn’t have this problem, because the 
Convergence Constraint can explain the value of rationality from the perspective of any 
coherent credence function. To see this, first note that whether a credence function has better 
convergence performance than another in a learning problem is a mathematical truth, not an 
empirical one—we only need to employ our knowledge of mathematical facts in reasoning 
about whether a credence function achieves convergence in a maximal domain, whether its 
convergence is speed-optimal, or whether it minimizes retraction. This differs sharply from 
our reasoning about expected accuracy—to know the expected accuracy of the 
counterinductivist’s prediction ‘the next emerald is not green,’ we need to rely on our own 
opinion about the empirical matter ‘the next emerald is not green.’ Therefore, we cannot give 
an expected-accuracy argument against counterinduction without relying on our own 
inductive methods. In contrast, when a learning problem is given, reasoning about 
convergence performance doesn’t rely on our views on empirical matters, and thus the 
reasoning is available for any probabilistically coherent person—including an irrational 
person like the counterinductivist. For example, in the above sub-section, the fact that the 
enumerative inductivist converges to truth in strictly more worlds than the counterinductivist 
does is a fact that even the counterinductivist herself can see, because argument for this fact 
has not employed enumerative induction—it’s a deductive argument. 
3.3.5 Explaining why more evidence tends to be better. It’s well-known that 
accuracy-centered epistemologists can explain the value of evidence by invoking Good’s 
theorem, which says that it’s always rational to gather free evidence before acting. 
Convergence-theoretic epistemology can also explain why more evidence tends to be better 
for rational persons. As I’ve mentioned above, learning-theoretic epistemology has a dynamic 
character—what it demands on a rational method is not that it yields accurate beliefs at a 
static evidential situation but that it improves accuracy as evidence grows. Therefore, the 
rewards of being rational (i.e., the rewards of having good convergence properties) is 
 12 
primarily reflected in the dynamic process of belief-revision as evidence grows. Then it’s no 
wonder that more evidence tends to benefit rational persons.  
To illustrate, consider an important desirable mode of convergence that learning 
theorists call ‘logical reliability’ (i.e., converging to truth in every possible world). If your 
learning method has this property, then you are guaranteed to approach the maximally 
accurate beliefs as you get more evidence, even if your method doesn’t output highly 
accurate beliefs at the initial stages of inquiry. Moreover, even if your goal is not maximally 
accurate beliefs but merely beliefs whose accuracy passes certain threshold, more evidence 
still tends to be better, or at least not worse: for any desired level of accuracy, the finite stage 
of inquiry at which convergence to that level of accuracy begins is always a nondecreasing 
function of the desired level of accuracy.12 So, it always takes no less evidence, and 
sometimes it takes more evidence, in order to stabilize on beliefs with a greater level of 
accuracy.13 
(I should clarify that, to say that the benefit of rationality is reflected in a dynamic 
process of belief revision is not to say that you should extend your inquiry indefinitely long 
in order to reap that benefit. Since convergence, if achievable at all, always begins at some 
finite stage of inquiry, there is always a finite point at which you can stop your inquiry, 
because if you have converged to a desired level of accuracy then further inquiry won’t make 
the accuracy of your belief fall below that level. So, more evidence is better only in the 
process of achieving convergence; once convergence has achieved and your belief has 
stabilized on the desired level of accuracy, further inquiry is not necessary. This accords with 
a familiar idea that knowledge, which is understood as a stable true belief in this context, 
marks the end of inquiry.)  
In sum, convergence-theoretic epistemology has many interesting or attractive 
features: It provides a dynamic explanation of the value of rationality; it’s continuous with 
the Platonic value on stability of true beliefs; it has many virtues that our current decision-
theoretic accuracy-centered epistemology has, such as recovering norms of rationality and 
explaining why more evidence is better; in addition, it recovers norms of rationality in a 
perspective-neutral way. Of course, you might still find the defense offered above 
inadequate; in particular, you might worry that, by focusing on convergence properties, 
convergence-theoretic epistemology focuses too much on the long run and doesn’t say much 
about the short run. This is an important concern, and I will return to it soon. But first let me 
                                               
12 To illustrate, for any w and any proposition H, min{n: for all m ≥ n, |P(H|E6/)	– IH(w)| < 0.3} could not be 
smaller than min{n: for all m ≥ n, |P(H|E6/)	– IH(w)| < 0.5}. The proof is trivial: minA ≥ minB if A ⊆ B. 
13 Some results in computational learning theory—a practical extension of formal learning theory that studies 
computational efficiency of learning methods—also tell us about the value of growing evidence. A fundamental 
theorem of computational learning theory tells us that, when your evidential stream is generated by some 
unknown objective probability function, the sample size that guarantees certain level of predictive accuracy at 
certain level of objective probability is an increasing function of the desired degree of accuracy and the desired 
objective probability. Therefore, if you want greater predictive accuracy or a fixed level of desired-accuracy at a 
greater probability no matter what the underlying objective probability function is, you will need more evidence. 
For a precise statement of the theorem that tells us the above result, see Kononenko & Kukar (2007, pp. 402–4). 
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explain why convergence-theoretic epistemology is compatible with and even favors 
permissivism.  
 
4. The Convergence Constraint Favors Permissivism 
In section 2, we’ve seen that permissivism is incompatible with the Expectation 
Constraint, and we’ve seen that the incompatibility arises because, for some coherent 
credence within the rational range, a credence outside the range could be closer to it than 
some insider, and a coherent person always regards closer credence as more expectedly 
accurate. In particular, given strict propriety, a coherent person always regards her own 
credence as uniquely maximizing expected accuracy.  
Similar problem wouldn’t arise for Convergence Constraint, for a coherent person 
needs not view closer credence as having better convergence performance. Indeed, we’ve 
seen from the above vindication of enumerative induction that a counterinductivist can see 
that his convergence performance is worse than that of the enumerative inductivist, even 
though his own credence is clearly the closest to his own credence. In general, the vindication 
arguments for norms of rationality listed in the above section imply that a credence function’s 
convergence performance depends on whether it satisfies the vindicated norms of rationality. 
So, even if credence function A is closer to you than credence function B is, if A doesn’t 
satisfy some norms of rationality (such as reflection) but B satisfies all norms, then you could 
still view A as having worse convergence performance than B.     
So, if the Convergence Constraint were incompatible with permissivism, it cannot be 
due to a reason that is similar to the reason why the Expectation Constraint is incompatible 
with permissivism. Are there any other reasons to think that they are incompatible? I can see 
none. Nothing in the constraint rules out the possibility that, in some learning problems, two 
different credence functions both have good convergence performance. After all, the 
convergence mode of a credence function is not always sensitive to small variance in the 
precise values the function assigns to each proposition. Consider, for instance, the mode of 
convergence about speed. Two different credence functions could converge to truth equally 
fast, according to the following natural way of defining speed of convergence.  
Recall the learning problem modelled as (W, F) in Section 3.2. For any proposition A 
in F, any real number 𝜖 in [0, 1] and any world w in W, we can define a function C>/3(P), 
which measures how fast one’s current credence P has its posterior on A falling within 𝜖-
range of the truth value of A in w, as the least number of experiments P needs in order for its 
posterior to fall within the range. That is:  
 
C>/3(P) = min{n: for all m ≥ n, |P(A|E6/)	− IA(w)| < 𝜖} 
 
Then we can consider another probability function Q defined on F, and we can define ‘one 
converges to truth faster than the other’ as:  
 
P converges to the truth about A faster than Q if:  
														C@/3(P)  ≤ C@/3(Q)	for	all	ϵ	in	[0, 1]	and	all	w	in	W,	and 
    C@/3(P) <	C@/3(Q)	for some ϵ	in	[0, 1]	and	some	w in W.  
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Last, we can say that P and Q converge to the truth of A at an equal speed if neither one 
converges faster than the other.14 It’s easy to verify that, on this definition of speed of 
convergence, two different credence functions could converge to the truth of a target 
proposition at an equal speed. In fact, even for some designated ϵ	and	some	designated	w, 
there could be two probability functions P and Q such that C>/3(P) = C>/3(Q). For example, 
suppose ϵ = 0.1	and	the designated world w is a world in which A is true. This situation is 
possible: On the 10th experiment, a Bayesian agent updates his credence from 0.5 to 0.9, and 
another Bayesian agent updates her credence from 0.6 to 0.9. That is, both agents take 10 
experiments to make their posteriors on A fall within the range [0.9, 1].   
In fact, the Convergence Constraint is not only compatible with permissivism but also 
favors it. For there are learning problems in which not all the desirable modes of convergence 
can be achieved, and thus a trade-off among those modes must be made. For example, 
Schulte (1999a, pp. 404–7) has pointed out that, in the simple learning problem that he calls 
‘one-shot Riddle of Induction,’ the goal of minimaxing retractions comes into conflict with 
the goal of fast convergence.15 If we assume that there is no unique best way to trade off the 
desirable modes of convergence, then rational credence functions given a body of evidence 
will not be unique since credence functions with the best convergence performance in a 
learning problem would not be unique—some might converge to truth faster, while others 
might converge to truth with less retractions.  
This argument is reminiscent of a familiar defense of permissivism that focuses on 
trade-offs among different epistemic values (e.g., seeking truths and avoiding errors) or 
among different theoretical virtues. As some permissivists have argued, relative to the same 
body of evidence, some credence functions are simpler while others are more explanatory; 
and since there doesn’t seem to be a unique best way to trade off these two virtues, rational 
credence functions need not be unique (Titelbaum, 2015, p. 674). In a similar spirit, the 
argument in the above paragraph says that, given the same evidence, different credence 
functions could be equally rational because there are many ways of being truth-conducive 
                                               
14 The characterization of convergence speed of credence functions here is inspired by Schulte’s (1999a, p. 413) 
definition of ‘data-minimal’ learning methods that concern binary beliefs. Nielsen and Wofsey (2020, p. 4) use a 
similar characterization.   
15 Here is the basic idea. In one-shot Riddle of Induction, there are only two competing hypotheses: all emeralds 
are green, or all emeralds are grue, where ‘grue’ is defined relative to a critical time t; And we obtain conclusive 
evidence at time t: if the emerald observed at t is green, we know for certain that not all emeralds are grue; if the 
emerald observed at t is blue, we know for certain that not all emeralds are green. Consider two learning 
methods, a cautious one and a natural one. The cautious method says that we wait for the conclusive evidence at 
t before making a projection; the natural method says that we project the green hypothesis from the beginning 
and keep doing so until we obtain conflicting evidence, and if that happens we change mind and project the grue 
hypothesis. The cautious method minimaxes retraction, since it doesn’t have to retract no matter which 
hypothesis is true and the natural method might have to retract once; but the natural method dominates the 
cautious one in speed of convergence: if the grue hypothesis is true then both methods converge to truth at t and 
not before then; but if the green hypothesis is true, then the natural method converges to truth from the 
beginning and the cautious method doesn’t converge before t.  
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(that is, there are many desirable modes of convergence to truth) and different credence 
functions could be truth-conducive in different ways.  
 
5. Worries About the Convergence-Theoretic Epistemology  
There is a worry lurking in the above argument that the Convergence Constraint is 
compatible with and even favors permissivism. The above argument might make you worry 
that learning-theoretic epistemology is too lenient, and thus it would lead to a form of 
permissivism that’s too radical. After all, the Convergence Constraint seems to primarily 
focus on the long run and doesn’t say much about the short run. That is, it focuses on what 
adopting a learning method implies in an infinitely long sequence of inquiry, where evidence 
grows without bounds, and it ignores the method’s implication in much shorter run, such as 
when the evidence is fixed or grows with bounds.   
Now, let me note that this worry about the long-run is not a single worry but consists 
of several separate, interrelated worries. First, the worry might be that learning-theoretic 
epistemology allows any behavior in the short-run as long as the long-run behavior is good. 
Or, the worry might be that learning-theoretic epistemology just couldn’t be a correct 
epistemology, since long-run considerations shouldn’t be relevant at all given the famous 
Keynesian warning ‘in the long run, we are all dead.’ Or, the worry might be that, even if 
long-run considerations are important, they just couldn’t do enough explanatory work. In 
particular, they can at most explain the benefits of rationality in unbounded dynamic 
evidential situation and couldn’t explain the benefits of rationality in static evidential 
situations. In what follows, I respond to the three worries in turn.  
 
5.1 Anything Goes in the Short-Run?   
The response to the first worry is easy: It’s not the case that learning-theoretic 
epistemology allows anything to go in the short run. Whether a learning method converges to 
truth at all indeed depends only on how it behaves in the long run, but some desirable modes 
of convergence also depends on its behavior in the short run. To illustrate, consider the mode 
of convergence concerning speed, which has played an essential role in Nielsen and 
Wosfey’s argument for the reflection principle. This mode clearly depends on the short-run. 
For two credence functions that both converge to the truth in a world, one might take no more 
than 100 experiments to update to a high credence in the truth of the world, whereas the other 
might take no more than 10 experiments. So, their behaviors in the first 100 experiments are 
clearly relevant to how fast they converge to the truth in a world.  
Another mode of convergence that involves the short-run is ‘minimaxing retraction,’ 
that is, minimizing the greatest possible times of retraction. And this mode of convergence 
has played a significant role in learning theorists’ argument for rationality norms like 
Occam’s Razor (Kelly 2007, 2010; Schulte, 1999b). Here is an example originated from 
Schulte (1999b, pp. 17–18). Suppose that two persons face a learning problem in which the 
hypotheses are from {All emeralds are green; All emeralds are grue(1); All emeralds are 
grue(2), …}, where an emerald is grue(n) if either it’s green and observed before time n, or 
it’s blue and not observed before n. Suppose that the first person projects naturally: she starts 
with high confidence in ‘all emeralds are green’ and continues to hold high confidence until a 
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blue emerald is observed at some time n; if that happens she changes mind and switches to 
high confidence in the competing hypothesis ‘all emeralds are grue(n).’ By contrast, the 
second person starts with high confidence in ‘all emeralds are grue(2),’ and if the first two 
observed emeralds are green, then he changes mind and switches to high confidence in ‘all 
emeralds are green’ and starts to behave like the first person since then. Then this person’s 
mode of convergence is not as good as the first person’s in avoiding retraction: the first 
person needs to change mind at most once whereas the second person might need to change 
mind twice—for instance, in the world in which emeralds are (Green, Green, Green, Blue, 
Blue, …), the second person needs to change mind at both time 2 and time 4. So, although 
both persons converge to truth eventually, their short run performance is relevant in 
determining their mode of convergence concerning frequency of retractions.  
 
5.2 How Could Long-Run Considerations Even Be Relevant?   
Here is the second worry. Convergence considerations are all about what happens in 
the limit. It’s good that they imply some short-run constraints, but this is not good enough, 
for short-run considerations should be our only considerations. As Keynes has famously said, 
‘in the long run, we are all dead.’ So, all considerations about what happens in the limit are 
irrelevant to rationality and thus convergence-theoretic epistemology must fail. 
In reply, first note that caring about the long-run is not unique to convergence-
theoretic epistemology; rather, it crops up in a wide variety of other epistemological theories. 
The widespread use of long-run defense gives us a reason to think that long-run 
considerations are not as illegitimate or irrelevant as they first seem.  
As a first example, consider the norm of maximizing expected utility. Although this 
norm has been defended on multiple grounds such as representation theorems or the norm’s 
widespread applications, the long-run defense invoking the strong law of large numbers 
remains an important motivation (Briggs, 2019). It says that, if you maximize expected utility 
in a decision problem, then by the strong law of large numbers, you will almost surely 
maximize average actual utility if you stick with the same choice in an infinitely long 
repetition of the same decision problem. This motivation is clearly a long-run defense, since 
the strong law of large numbers only says that the average value will approach the expected 
value in an infinitely long sequence of repeated experiments.  
Other examples of long-run defenses of rationality norms abound. For instance, the 
‘Why ain’cha rich?’ argument is firstly proposed to defend evidential decision theory, which 
says that the one-boxer in the Newcomb’s Problem is richer than the two-boxer in the long 
run (Ahmed, 2014, p. 194; Hare & Hedden, 2016); new versions of the ‘Why ain’cha rich?’ 
arguments have been developed to undermine evidential decision theory (Gallow, 2021; 
Wells, 2017). One early defense of the Principal Principle says that following the principle 
allows us to choose a winning strategy in certain gamble when the gamble is played infinitely 
often (Mellor, 1982, p. 59). In philosophy of statistics, long-run considerations are used to 
motivate the Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test: as we use this inference rule infinitely often, 
the frequency of error will be low (Neyman & Pearson, 1933, p. 291). And the famous 
Bayesian Information Criterion in curve-fitting, which implies that we should select the 
simplest model that fits data, is motivated by the long-run consideration that the criterion will 
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select the model that maximizes posterior probability as data size tends to infinity (Schwarz, 
1978). 
Now, I don’t mean to claim that long-run defenses are the only kind of defenses of the 
above norms of rationality, but only to emphasize that long-run considerations can reveal a 
lot of important features inherit in a method. Besides, it’s true that the above examples don’t 
involve exactly the same kind of long-run thinking—some focus on infinite repetition of the 
same evidence while others focus on infinite expansion of growing evidence; some focus on 
long-run average wealth while others focus on long-run wealth creation. However, they all 
suggest that questions like ‘what if I do this every time’ or ‘what if I use this method 
infinitely often’ could be relevant to our current, individual decision. Moreover, they seem 
relevant even if we know that we won’t use the method infinitely often since we will die in 
finite time. Here is a helpful analogy. Recall the Dutch-book argument for probabilism, 
which says that being coherent keeps you from being dutch-booked. We may dislike this 
argument for many reasons, but it seems wrong to dismiss the argument simply by noting that 
there are no clever bookies around us. Or consider the money-pump argument for the 
transitivity of preference, which says that I could serve as a money pump if my preference is 
not transitive. Again, it seems wrong for me to dismiss this argument simply by noting that 
nobody around me is out there to exploit my incoherent preference. For the same reason, it 
seems wrong to dismiss all long-run defenses simply by noting that we won’t live in the long 
run. The general lesson is that we may not want our beliefs or preferences to have certain 
features that are instantiated in certain settings, even if we know that those settings are not 
real.  
 
5.3 What About the Short-Term Benefits of Rationality? 
Here comes our third worry about the long-run: Perhaps it’s true that we shouldn’t 
dismiss convergence-theoretic epistemology for its focus on the long run, but the problem 
remains that convergence-considerations, as a kind of long-run considerations, seem too thin 
to do enough explanatory work that we want a theory of rationality to do. More specifically, 
we expect a theory of rationality to vindicate not only the long-term benefit of rationality but 
also the short-term benefit. Especially, we expect a theory to imply that rationality is 
beneficial even in a fixed rather than growing evidential situation. And convergence-theoretic 
epistemology can’t accomplish the latter task.  
In response to this worry, first recall that convergence-theoretic epistemology is 
highly successful in recovering norms of rationality like enumerative induction and 
simplicity; some initial attempts have been made to recover the reflection principle. And 
considering that there are still many unexplored modes of convergence,16 convergence-
theoretic epistemology can hope to recover further norms of rationality. If obeying those 
                                               
16 For instance, instead of requiring convergence to certainty in H if H is true and minimal confidence in H if H 
is false, we might require convergence to certainty in H if H is true and anything but convergence to certainty if 
H is false, or we may require convergence to minimal confidence if H is false and anything but convergence to 
minimal confidence if H is true. Moreover, when we know that the evidence stream is generated by some 
objective probability distribution (although we might not know what that distribution is), we may require that 
the convergence take place with high objective probability no matter what the underlying distribution is. (This 
kind of convergence is studied in PAC-learning in statistical learning theory.) 
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norms of rationality has short-term benefits, then convergence-theoretic epistemology can 
vindicate the short-term benefits of rationality. (If obeying those norms doesn’t have short-
term benefits, then perhaps we should rethink whether rationality necessarily has short-term 
benefit.)  
Moreover, even if it turns out that convergence-theoretic epistemologists are unable to 
recover all rationality norms, they need not despair, because they can regard their project as 
an important supplement to, not a replacement of, the current decision-theoretic, accuracy-
centered epistemology, which has been successful in explaining the short-term benefit of 
rationality for a wide range of rationality norms (i.e., benefits of obeying rational norms in 
fixed evidential situations).17 Although I have explained the difference between the 
convergence framework and the current decision-theoretic framework, I don’t mean to 
suggest that the two must be incompatible. For we might want both long-term benefits and 
short-term benefits in choosing a learning method, just like a company that aims at profit-
maximization might consider both short-term profits and long-term profits in choosing a 
policy. Moreover, since rationality norms come in a variety of different forms, we shouldn’t 
be surprised to find that they are truth-conducive for a variety of different reasons in the 
sense that some concern short-term benefits and others concern long-term benefits. 
If we admit that both the long-term and short-term effects of a learning method matter 
for rationality, where does this leave of permissivism, dialectically speaking? My speculation 
is that it would bolster the case for permissivism, because it’s likely to generate further 
sources of permissivity of rationality. For now we have additional trade-offs to make, if we 
assume that there are learning problems in which no method can maximize both long-term 
and short-term benefits (an assumption that I wish to confirm in future work). Then trade-offs 
will arise not only among long-term benefits themselves (since there are different desirable 
convergence modes, as I’ve mentioned above), but also between long-term benefits and 
short-term benefits. Some methods might achieve a high level of accuracy relative to the 
current evidential situation, but fail to improve accuracy as evidence grows once it reaches 
that level. Other methods might have to take much more evidence to achieve the same level 
of accuracy, but they are able to keep improving accuracy as evidence grows. An accuracy-
maximizer might have to make a choice between the two kinds of methods, just like a 
company might have to choose between an unsustainable policy that brings huge short-term 
gain and a more sustainable policy that brings moderate and yet steady gain.       
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have proposed a new response to the value problem for permissivism: 
Rationality is valuable in pursuing accuracy because rational credence performs better with 
respect to convergence to truth, and this view is compatible with and even favors 
permissivism. I have argued that this convergence-theoretic epistemology has many 
interesting and attractive features. I hope my discussion has given permissivists a new way of 
explaining how rationality could be accuracy-conducive if it’s permissive. In addition, I hope 
                                               
17 See Joyce (1998) and Pettigrew (2016). Note that all these attempts of recovering rationality norms don’t 
assume the Expectation Constraint. So, it’s unproblematic for permissivists to accept all of them.  
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that this paper will initiate further explorations of the convergence-theoretic epistemology, 
about what it can do and what it implies for other debates in epistemology.18   






































                                               
18 This paper benefited greatly from discussion with David Thorstad, Selim Berker, Zach Barnett, Jie Gao, Jin 
Zeng, audiences at the First Asian Epistemologists Workshop, audiences at Brown University Epistemology 
Reading Group, and (especially) an anonymous referee for PPR.  
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